Editors' Summary by The Editors
Editors’Summary
The brookings panel on Economic Activity held its seventy-eighth con-
ference in Washington, D.C., on September 9 and 10, 2004. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discussions
presented at the conference. The ﬁrst paper evaluates unconventional mea-
sures available to monetary policymakers for stimulating the economy
when interest rates are already near zero, a situation that may arise with
price stability or negative inflation. The second paper presents empirical
evidence on the effects of taxes, federal spending, and deﬁcits on national
saving, interest rates, and growth. The third paper explores the impacts on
U.S. employment in recent years from conventional foreign trade in goods
and from the rise in offshoring of service jobs. The fourth paper examines
the effect of tax changes, such as those passed since 2000, on business
capital formation. 
CENTRAL BANKS USUALLY implement monetary policy by setting the short-
term nominal interest rate that the bank controls, such as the federal funds
rate in the United States. However, the success of many industrial coun-
tries over the years in reducing inﬂation and, consequently, average nomi-
nal interest rates has increased the likelihood that, during a recession, the
policy rate will approach its lower bound of zero. When rates are at or near
zero, a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further
rate reductions and must rely instead on “nonstandard” policy alternatives.
An extensive literature examines these alternatives, but for the most part
from a theoretical or historical perspective. Few studies have presented
empirical evidence on their potential effectiveness in modern economies.
Such evidence not only would help central banks plan for the contingency
of the policy rate approaching zero, but also would bear directly on the
choice of the appropriate inﬂation objective in normal times: the greater the
confidence of central bankers that tools exist to help the economy escape
ix
2581-00b_Editors  Sum.qxd    1/18/05    13:12    Page  ixthe liquidity trap that occurs at the zero bound, the less need there is to
maintain an inﬂation “buffer.” Hence evidence of effective alternative poli-
cies would bolster the argument for a lower inﬂation objective. In the ﬁrst
article of this issue, Ben Bernanke, Vincent Reinhart, and Brian Sack apply
the tools of modern empirical finance to the recent experiences of the
United States and Japan to look for such evidence.1
Following earlier work by Bernanke and Reinhart, the authors group
nonstandard policy alternatives into three classes: ofﬁcial communications
designed to shape public expectations about the future course of interest
rates; quantitative easing, which increases both assets (holdings of govern-
ment securities) and liabilities (unborrowed reserves) on the central bank’s
balance sheet; and changes in the composition of that balance sheet
through, for example, targeted purchases of long-term bonds aimed at
reducing long-term interest rates.
The authors’investigation employs two approaches. First, they perform
event-study analysis, measuring and analyzing the behavior of selected
asset prices and yields over short periods surrounding central bank state-
ments or other financial or economic news. Second, they estimate “no-
arbitrage” models of the term structure of interest rates for both the United
States and Japan. For any given set of macroeconomic conditions and
stance of monetary policy, these models allow the authors to predict inter-
est rates at all maturities. Using the predicted term structure as a bench-
mark, they are then able to assess whether factors not included in the
model—such as the Bank of Japan’s quantitative easing policy that began
in 2001—have economically signiﬁcant effects on interest rates.
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack begin with a discussion of nonstandard
policies that might be effective in stimulating the economy when short-term
rates are at the zero bound; the discussion draws on the historical experi-
ence with such policies in the United States and Japan as well as on exist-
ing theories of potential policy channels and previous empirical analysis.
The ﬁrst type of policy they consider is the use of central bank communi-
cations to inﬂuence the market’s expectations about future policy and hence
future short-term rates. According to some theories, shaping expectations
about future short-term rates is essentially the only tool central bankers
have. But the authors take a broader view, arguing that private sector bor-
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than to short-term rates, and considering the possibility that long-term rates
can be moved independently of expectations of short-term rates. This leads
to a discussion of the potential importance of policy statements, credibil-
ity, and policy rules. Although the authors see “rule-like” central bank
behavior, particularly state-contingent behavior, as an important means of
shaping the public’s policy expectations, they believe that a central bank
would ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult to establish in advance how it would react
to highly unusual circumstances, such as when the short-term rate is near
the zero bound. Hence in such cases statements about policy intentions
and commitments are likely to be particularly important. 
The second type of nonstandard policy, quantitative easing, involves pur-
chasing government securities beyond what is required to drive the short-
term rate to zero. The authors discuss three channels through which such a
policy might operate to escape the liquidity trap. First, such purchases may
lead to private sector rebalancing of portfolios, which in turn would raise
the prices of other assets. However, the authors observe that there will be
little incentive to rebalance if money is a good substitute for the short-
term bills it replaces when the latter are paying close to zero interest. Sec-
ond, a larger outstanding stock of money raises the prospect of higher
seigniorage in the event of future inﬂation, substituting for direct taxes. The
effectiveness of this “ﬁscal” channel requires that the public, in the midst of
a deﬂation, expect future inﬂation and expect that the central bank will not
withdraw the injected money when that inflation arrives. The authors
believe that the fiscal channel could work if pursued aggressively enough
and with a clear commitment not to reverse course. Third, the visible sig-
nal that quantitative easing provides makes it more believable that the cen-
tral bank will hesitate to reverse such large purchases soon, perhaps because
of the possible shock to money markets. 
The third type of nonstandard policy involves altering the composition of
the central bank’s balance sheet by participating in all segments of the
market in government debt, including inﬂation-indexed debt, so as to inﬂu-
ence term, risk, and liquidity premiums. Using emergency provisions dor-
mant since the 1930s, the Federal Reserve could even accept private
ﬁnancial and real assets as collateral for discount window loans. Although
many economists are skeptical about the potential effectiveness of this
channel, the authors note a number of historical examples of central banks
effectively pegging long-term rates.
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an event study measuring the influence of Federal Reserve policy
announcements by the response of three market-based indicators follow-
ing selected decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (the Federal
Reserve’s principal policymaking body) since 1991. The indicators are the
current-month federal funds futures contract, the Eurodollar futures con-
tract expiring in about a year, and the yield on Treasury securities of five
years’ maturity. The authors measure the responses of each indicator
observed during the forty-five minutes following FOMC announcements;
the very short time interval is chosen to minimize the extent to which other
factors could be affecting rates. The change in the current-month federal
funds futures contract simply measures the markets’reaction to news about
the Federal Reserve’s near-term funds target. The change in the year-ahead
Eurodollar futures contract presumably incorporates both the effect of this
funds rate surprise and the effect of any accompanying announcement on
market expectations about policy actions and the economy over the com-
ing year. The change in the five-year Treasury yield presumably includes
both those effects plus those arising from revisions in expectations beyond
a year. The authors decompose the second indicator into the part explained
by the ﬁrst factor, the funds “surprise,” and the orthogonal residual, which
they label a second factor. The change in the five-year rate not explained
by the ﬁrst two is designated a third factor. The authors ﬁnd that only about
20 percent of the variance in the one-year-ahead rate during the forty-ﬁve-
minute policy “window” is explained by the current policy surprise; unex-
plained movements in the year-ahead rate—the second factor—make up the
remaining 80 percent. Again, this factor presumably captures any revi-
sions in the private sector’s expectations of future short-term rates due to
information contained in the policy statement that accompanies the change
in the funds rate.
Perhaps the most striking revelation of the authors’analysis is the high
correlation between unexplained movements in the future one-year rate and
the five-year Treasury yield: the second factor accounts for 68 percent of
the variability of the ﬁve-year yield during the event window, and the pol-
icy surprise itself explains another 12 percent, leaving only 20 percent
unexplained. Informal inspection of the historical behavior of the second
factor reveals that it becomes increasingly important in the latter part of
the sample, when policy statements came into regular use. In contrast,
larger realizations of the ﬁrst and third factors do not seem to line up with
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gation of the link between FOMC statements and the three factors. First,
they regress the squared values of each of the factors on dummy variables
indicating dates when statements were issued and the characteristics of
those statements: The dummy variable STATEMENT takes a value of 1 on
any date on which a statement was released. STATEMENT SURPRISE
takes a value of 1 when, in the authors’judgment, the statement included
information about the economy or the path of policy that most market par-
ticipants would not have expected. Finally, PATH SURPRISE is set equal to
1 when, in the authors’judgment, the statement revealed new information
about the likely future path of monetary policy. The authors attempt to
assign “surprises” as objectively as possible, using commentaries written
before and after each statement was released (including those of a leading
ﬁnancial ﬁrm that specializes in monitoring FOMC actions), internal Fed-
eral Reserve staff analyses of market reactions, pre-FOMC meeting surveys
about expectations for the balance-of-risks part of the statement, and the
results of a survey of expectations about the statement conducted by the
New York Federal Reserve Bank. Of the 116 policy decisions in their sam-
ple, statements accompanied 56, and the authors identify 31 of them as hav-
ing a significant element of surprise, and 9 of these, in turn, as path
surprises. 
In the regression explaining the first factor, the coefficient on STATE-
MENT is positive and significant, and the authors attribute this result to
the fact that, for much of the sample, statements were made only on days
when the federal funds target was changed. These are days on which the
policy rate surprise tends to be relatively large. The coefﬁcient on STATE-
MENT SURPRISE in this regression is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting
that the FOMC viewed policy rate surprises and statements as substitutes,
possibly because the FOMC was reluctant to issue surprising statements at
the same time that it was also surprising the markets with the policy action.
The PATH SURPRISE variable is insigniﬁcant. 
The regressions explaining the second and third factors are of more
interest, since they provide information about how FOMC statements affect
market expectations. The mere issuance of a statement has essentially no
effect on the variance of the second factor; in contrast, in periods when
there is a statement surprise, the variance is nearly 200 basis points, and
when there is also a path surprise, the variance is roughly 230 basis points.
When the first two factors are controlled for, the five-year yield is not
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statements do not appear to provide information about long-term yields
independent of their influence on expectations about rates one year in the
future. 
FOMC statements often contain language that suggests the direction of
future policy actions. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack investigate whether the
direction of the response of the factors is consistent with whether a “sur-
prise” statement appears hawkish, dovish, or neutral with regard to interest
rates. They deﬁne two dummy variables, for statement and path surprises,
each of which takes a value of +1 for surprises that are judged to be hawk-
ish, –1 for those judged to be dovish, and zero otherwise. They ﬁnd no sig-
nificant response of either the first or the third factor to either of these
dummies. However, they find that hawkish statement surprises increase, and
dovish surprises decrease, the year-ahead rate by 12 basis points. The
response to path surprises is an even greater 16 basis points. Both responses
are highly signiﬁcant. The authors note that, in addition to the ofﬁcial FOMC
statements they study, the speeches and congressional testimony of FOMC
members may be important in shaping expectations. 
Beyond their direct effects, statements that are conditional—that is, that
make the central bank’s commitments contingent on specific economic
developments—are likely to affect the market response to news about those
events. For example, the statement that “[monetary] policy accommodation
can be maintained for a considerable period,” first introduced in Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s semiannual report to Congress in July
2003, was, in subsequent FOMC statements, typically tied to labor market
conditions and “slack” in the economy. A regression relating changes in the
ten-year Treasury yield to surprises in the monthly payroll report shows
greater sensitivity after August 2003 than in the preceding twelve years; this
is consistent with the claim that this FOMC language heightened the mar-
ket’s attention to employment growth. 
Although the event studies succeed in isolating the effects of FOMC pol-
icy announcements, they measure only very short term effects and do not
take advantage of the restrictions linking yields of various maturities nor-
mally incorporated in term structure equations. Particularly when one is
evaluating unusual policies, such as buybacks of longer-term Treasuries, it
is useful to measure changes in yields against a “benchmark” term structure
that incorporates these linkages and takes into account the observable
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curve. For this purpose the authors use a “no-arbitrage” term structure
model in which long-term yields are determined by two components: the
expected future path of one-period interest rates, and a term premium in
yields at various maturities that investors require as compensation for the
risk in holding longer-term investments. The authors estimate a quarterly
vector autoregression (VAR) for ﬁve observable factors that, taken together,
provide a reasonable summary of economic conditions relevant to the term
structure: the employment gap, the previous year’s core inﬂation, expected
inflation for the coming year (taken from the Blue Chip survey), the federal
funds rate, and the year-ahead Eurodollar futures rate. The first compo-
nent—the expected future path of one-period interest rates—can be com-
puted by simply iterating the estimated VAR forward. The risks that are
priced in the second component—the term premium—are the innovations
in the VAR process, with prices that are assumed to depend only on the con-
temporaneous values of the variables in the VAR. The authors estimate
these prices by ﬁtting the model to zero-coupon Treasury yields at maturi-
ties of six months and one, two, three, four, ﬁve, seven, and ten years. The
estimated effects of risks on the term structure are of interest in themselves.
The authors ﬁnd that the term premium for longer maturities has declined
over time, presumably reflecting greater stability in the economy and in
policy. The estimated model predicts the Treasury yield curve reasonably
well at all maturities: the standard deviation of prediction error is 33 basis
points at six months and increases to around 80 basis points for longer
maturities. The authors’results show that the year-ahead futures rate makes
an important contribution to the accuracy of the model’s predictions, reduc-
ing the standard deviation of prediction error for the one-year yield by
about 30 basis points, or 35 percent; smaller contributions are found for
longer maturities, decreasing from about 20 basis points for the two- and
three-year yields to a mere 7 basis points for the ten-year yield. 
How large are the innovations in the year-ahead futures contracts accord-
ing to the VAR, how does their magnitude compare with the earlier event-
study estimates of the impact of policy surprises, and by how much do these
innovations shift Treasury yields at various maturities? The authors show
that the event-study estimates of the effect of policy on the futures rate are
only a small fraction of the VAR innovations before July 2003, but that
since then the standard deviation of VAR innovations has fallen and that of
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innovations. Some of this difference may reflect communications effects
not captured in the statements, and some must reﬂect responses of expec-
tations to developments in the economy unrelated to FOMC communica-
tions. The authors examine in some detail the comparison of VAR
innovations and event-study shocks during the period from August to
December 2003, during which the FOMC used the “considerable period”
language. During that period the results from the event study suggested that
FOMC communications pushed down the Eurodollar futures rate by a
cumulative 19 basis points, whereas the VAR innovation lowered that rate
by 63 basis points. The model predicts that a 63-basis-point decline in the
futures rate would shift the yield curve down 25 basis points at a two-year
horizon and 7 basis points at a ten-year horizon. The authors guess that the
true communications effect is somewhere between these two extremes. 
The effectiveness of the third type of nonconventional policy, changes in
the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet, depends on whether
substitution among assets is sufficiently imperfect that large purchases of
a speciﬁc class of asset might affect its yield relative to the short-term inter-
est rate. If composition matters, the FOMC has the ability to stimulate the
economy even when the federal funds rate is constrained by the zero ﬂoor.
Because the Federal Reserve has not undertaken large purchases of longer-
term assets in recent years, the authors instead examine three recent
episodes in which it seems plausible that many market participants came
to anticipate signiﬁcant changes in the relative supplies of Treasury securi-
ties. The ﬁrst of these was the Treasury’s announcement in 1999 of a plan
to buy back government debt in the face of prospective budget surpluses;
the second was the investment in Treasury securities by Asian ofﬁcial insti-
tutions intervening in exchange markets after the currency crises of 1998;
the third was in the summer of 2003, when some ﬁnancial market partici-
pants came to believe the Federal Reserve might purchase long-term Trea-
sury securities in order to combat incipient deﬂation. For each episode the
authors examine the movement of a number of yields in narrow windows
surrounding important announcements and the movements of the residuals
from the benchmark term structure model. 
The dating of each episode is necessarily imprecise. The gradual elimi-
nation of government interest-bearing debt began with the surpluses that
emerged in the early 1990s, and by the end of the decade many observers
were forecasting that Treasury debt would disappear by 2010. Bernanke,
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salient in investors’minds: the mid-quarter refunding announcements of
February 2000, when the under secretary of the Treasury suggested that
the ten-year note would replace the thirty-year bond as the benchmark long-
term security; and the November 2001 refunding announcement, when the
Treasury conﬁrmed it would stop selling the long bond. The authors report
that in both cases the Treasury yield curve rotated down dramatically.
Examination of their estimated term structure model that controls for vari-
ations in the economy and policy shows that the yield on twenty-year bonds
dropped roughly 80 basis points below what was expected for this period.
The authors view these results as only suggestive of the efﬁcacy of decreas-
ing the relative supply of long-term government debt, recognizing that the
term structure model is unlikely to capture all the other factors that changed
expectations about the supplies of bonds, and that it is hard to know the
probability that investors assigned to a sizable paydown. They also note that
the reaction of yields on long-term Treasuries did not translate into a reduc-
tion in interest rates on privately issued debt—long-term swap spreads
widened noticeably during the period. 
The beginning of the accumulation of Treasury securities by foreign ofﬁ-
cial institutions is likewise difﬁcult to date with any precision. Since 1998
the value of securities held in custody for foreign governments at the New
York Federal Reserve Bank has almost doubled, reaching $1
1⁄4 trillion. Jap-
anese authorities in particular intervened heavily in foreign exchange mar-
kets in 2003, when their purchases totaled $177 billion, and the ﬁrst quarter
of 2004, when they purchased $138 billion. Regressions of changes in
two-, ﬁve-, and ten-year Treasury yields on the volume of dollar interven-
tions, which the authors assume were immediately recognized by market
participants, show small (less than 1 basis point per $1 billion of interven-
tion) but statistically signiﬁcant changes in the three-day period beginning
with the intervention. Interestingly, swap spreads did not increase during
this period, suggesting that the effects on the Treasury yields were trans-
mitted to yields on private debt. Yields on five- and ten-year Treasuries
remained 50 to 100 basis points below the predictions of the benchmark
term structure model during this period. Although these findings are sug-
gestive, the authors note that yields had begun to move down before the siz-
able Japanese interventions, perhaps because of fears of deﬂation. 
The authors refer to the period between the fall of 2002 and the sum-
mer of 2003 as the “2003 deflation scare,” a period when various Federal
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sible response of monetary policy should the funds rate approach its lower
bound of zero. Although ofﬁcials consistently described this possibility as
remote, the authors observe that some market participants believed the Fed-
eral Reserve took the danger seriously enough to consider purchasing large
amounts of longer-term Treasuries. The perceived likelihood seemed to
peak with the May 2003 FOMC meeting statement. Such action was seen
to be “taken off the table” when the June FOMC statement did not men-
tion deflation and when Chairman Greenspan, in his July testimony, said,
“situations requiring special policy actions are most unlikely to arise.” The
ten-year Treasury yield moved sharply with these events, falling 20 basis
points with the May FOMC statement and rising abruptly with the June
statement (10 basis points) and the chairman’s July testimony (20 basis
points). Residuals from the benchmark term structure were consistent with
these responses. The authors caution against making too much of these
results, particularly since the period of the “scare” overlapped that of large-
scale purchases of Treasuries by foreign official institutions. But they
express confidence that, if the Federal Reserve were willing to purchase
an unlimited amount of a particular asset, they could establish the asset’s
price. 
The authors’analysis of the recent experience in Japan focuses on two
nonstandard policies recently employed by the country’s central bank, the
Bank of Japan. The first is the zero-interest-rate policy, under which the
central bank, beginning in 1999, committed to keep its policy rate, the call
rate, at zero until deﬂation had been eliminated; the second is the quantita-
tive easing policy, announced in 2001, which consists of providing bank
reserves at levels much greater than needed to maintain a policy rate of
zero. The evidence for the effectiveness of these policies is more mixed
than in the case of the United States. The authors’event-study analyses,
which may be less informative in Japan because of small sample sizes, do
not show any reliable relationship over the past few years between policy
statements by the Bank of Japan and markets’one-year-ahead policy expec-
tations. (The latter are measured in Japan’s case as the portion of move-
ments in the nearest Euroyen futures contract not explained by unexpected
changes in the current policy setting.) But the residuals from an estimated
term structure model for Japan similar to that used for the United States
make a stronger case for nonconventional policies. The Bank of Japan’s
use of quantitative easing, with which the United States has no recent expe-
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rate policy. Simulations of the model also indicate that interest rates at all
maturities were noticeably lower under both nonstandard policies than they
would have been otherwise.
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack believe that their results provide some
grounds for optimism about the likely efﬁcacy of two of their nonstandard
policies. In particular, they conﬁrm a potentially important role for central
bank communications in shaping public expectations of future policy
actions. In the United States, market expectations about the trajectory of the
federal funds rate over the next year appear strongly linked to Federal
Reserve policy statements. If such central bank “talk” does affect policy
expectations, then policymakers retain some leverage over long-term
yields, even if the current policy rate is at or near zero. Based on the recent
episodes they examine, the authors further suggest that large changes in
the relative supplies of securities may have economically signiﬁcant effects
on their yields. 
Yet despite their relatively encouraging ﬁndings concerning the potential
efﬁcacy of nonstandard policies at the zero bound, the authors are cautious
in making policy prescriptions because of the considerable uncertainty
about the size and reliability of these effects. They therefore counsel a
conservative approach—maintaining a sufﬁcient inﬂation buffer and apply-
ing preemptive easing as necessary to minimize the risk of hitting the zero
bound. But, recognizing that such policies cannot ensure that the zero
bound will never be hit, they argue that refining our understanding of the
potential usefulness of nonstandard policies for escaping the zero bound
should remain a high priority. 
If, in practice, fiscal policy were conducted so as to keep federal bud-
get balances within a moderate range, the implications of sustained large
deﬁcits would be of only academic interest. And in fact the budget balance
averaged a modest deficit during the first three postwar decades, with
mostly countercyclical fluctuations around that average. Fiscal discipline
has eroded sharply twice since then, ﬁrst in the early 1980s and then, after
recovering, again in the early 2000s. The standardized budget balance,
which adjusts for the effects of the business cycle, reached 5 percent of
GDP in the mid-1980s and recovered to about half that size by the early
1990s, after the second Reagan tax reform. The deﬁcit was steadily reduced
between 1992 and 2000, turning into a surplus by the end of the period. At
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ishing national debt might bring. Today, through a combination of large
tax cuts, weaker growth, higher defense spending, and the end of windfall
revenue from the booming stock market, the budget is over $400 billion in
deficit, and most private analysts project that deficits will remain a large
fraction of GDP for the indefinite future under likely policy scenarios—a
situation without precedent in U.S. economic history. In the second article
of this issue, William Gale and Peter Orszag analyze the likely effects of tax
cuts and deﬁcits and apply their ﬁndings to the ﬁscal situation under present
and projected policies. 
The authors examine the consequences of deficits for the economy by
conducting a careful empirical analysis of two channels through which
those consequences should operate. The ﬁrst is through saving, where the
issue is the extent to which government saving or dissaving (the govern-
ment budget balance) affects national saving, which is the sum of govern-
ment and private saving. In what Gale and Orszag call the conventional
case, private saving offsets little or none of a reduction in government sav-
ing, and so future national income and GNP are reduced by the returns
forgone due to the reduction in national saving and investment. In the polar
alternative, which, following the literature, the authors refer to as the Ricar-
dian equivalence case, an increase in the deficit resulting from a tax cut
induces an equal increase in private saving, so that national saving and
investment are unchanged, and future GNP is unaffected. The second chan-
nel works through interest rates. If, as in the conventional case, the deﬁcit
reduces national saving, and that in turn raises rates, domestic investment
will be reduced, lowering future GNP. In the absence of increased foreign
investment into the United States, this will result in a corresponding reduc-
tion in GDP. To the extent foreign investment makes up for the reduced
national saving, domestic investment, the domestic capital stock, and GDP
will be unaffected, but national income and GNP will fall relative to GDP
by the amount of the higher earnings paid to foreigners on their investment.
In the Ricardian equivalence case, since there is no effect of tax cut-induced
deﬁcits on national income, deﬁcits are not predicted to affect interest rates. 
Gale and Orszag survey the extensive empirical literature that uses time-
series data to estimate the effect of deﬁcits on private saving; they also reex-
amine and extend some of the earlier work and perform their own, new
tests. They ﬁrst reestimate the consumption function used in a 1990 paper
by Roger Kormendi and Philip Meguire, which relates aggregate consump-
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national product, equal to GNP minus capital depreciation) plus transfers
and government interest payments, minus taxes and retained earnings of
corporations—and to private net worth, the federal budget surplus, the stock
of government debt, and government spending on goods and services.
These authors and others interpret zero coefﬁcients on taxes and transfers in
this equation as support for the Ricardian case. Gale and Orszag note that
this interpretation rests on the questionable assumption that neither changes
in taxes nor changes in transfers are related to changes in future government
purchases, so that higher taxes or lower transfers today imply lower taxes or
higher transfers in the future. Nonetheless, they agree that the coefﬁcients
on taxes and transfers are relevant to the policy issue of how deﬁcits affect
future economic performance. By extending the data period to include the
1990s and the start of the 2000s, the authors can examine how the speciﬁ-
cation fits outside the original data period. These additional years may be
particularly informative because deﬁcits have ﬂuctuated widely. 
Using annual data, the authors estimate the consumption function for
two measures of the dependent variable: the first (that used by Kormendi
and Meguire) includes services of durables in consumption in addition to
spending on nondurables and services; the second is the simple sum of
nondurables and services, scaled up to preserve the mean level of total
consumption. They try three transformations of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables: first differences, first differences scaled by last year’s
NNP, and first differences of ratios to NNP. And they try some specifica-
tions of the independent variables that differ from those in previous work:
separating federal from state and local spending, and adding marginal
tax rates constructed so as to largely reflect legislative changes. The sep-
aration of federal from state and local taxes is motivated by the fact that
state and local revenue come largely from sales taxes, which vary posi-
tively with consumption, and this change proves to be the most important.
When the authors use Kormendi and Meguire’s specification of the vari-
ables in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and end the sample
period in 1992, they replicate the earlier authors’finding of no signifi-
cant effect of taxes on consumption. However, that finding is reversed
when the data period is extended, with the estimated effect of federal
taxes largest when the estimation extends through 2002. For this period,
and with the refined variables just described, estimates of the consump-
tion response to federal tax changes in the year they occur range from
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quent years. The effects of transfers on consumption are generally even
larger. These results with the Kormendi-Meguire equation thus overturn
those its originators found. 
Gale and Orszag turn next to an Euler equation formulation for estimat-
ing consumer behavior. In this formulation, as first developed by Robert
Hall, farsighted and rational consumers who are not subject to borrowing
constraints smooth their marginal utility over time; the path of their con-
sumption is a random walk with drift. Building on modiﬁcations suggested
by other researchers and their own work, the authors introduce a number
of other possible influences on consumption. They allow for a fraction of
consumers to be constrained by liquidity, so that their consumption is lim-
ited to current-period disposable income. They allow for wealth effects
and for the possibility that consumers distinguish between private net worth
and government bonds and that they adjust their consumption for expected
changes in government purchases. They also allow for the possible incen-
tive effects of marginal tax rates on personal and corporate income. The
authors ﬁrst examine this main case and then explore the effects of adding
other explanatory variables that might be expected to influence consumption.
In the main Euler equation speciﬁcation, when variables are expressed as
the ﬁrst difference in ratios to NNP, OLS estimates of tax effects are larger
than those found using the Kormendi-Meguire specification. The coeffi-
cients range between –0.5 and –0.7, depending on whether marginal tax
rates are included in the estimation equation. They are similar to the
Kormendi-Meguire results for the other two expressions of the variables. 
To address the possible bias from the endogeneity of the right-hand-
side variables in OLS estimation, Gale and Orszag also use values of most
of the right-hand-side variables with two or three lags as instruments for
their current values, and similarly lagged values of consumption as an
instrument for current income. They also present estimates in which all
the explanatory variables are instrumented, and estimates in which private
wealth and government bonds, measured at the end of the previous period,
are not instrumented. The authors find the effect of federal taxes on con-
sumption to be large and signiﬁcant in all the regressions. With all variables
included and instrumented, the coefficients are –1.0 and –0.9 for the two
measures of consumption in the ﬁrst-differences regressions, –0.6 and –0.5
in the first-differences-of-ratios regressions, and –0.7 in regressions with
either consumption variable in ratios. The authors see these results as con-
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rent consumption. Before-tax income is the only other variable that signif-
icantly affects consumption across all the instrumental variables
regressions. With two of the three transformations of the variables, its coef-
ﬁcient has a similar size (and opposite sign) as federal taxes; with the third,
the transformation using first differences of ratios to NNP, before-tax
income has a coefﬁcient of about 0.9.
Turning to the second channel of fiscal policy—the impact of govern-
ment deficits on interest rates—Gale and Orszag take pains to avoid 
contaminating their estimates with the well-established cyclical interrela-
tionships among output, interest rates, and deficits, and to focus on fiscal
developments to which forward-looking financial markets would be
expected to respond. Their review of recent research confirms the down-
ward bias that results from estimations that ignore these problems. For their
main regressions the authors focus on the real interest rate on ten-year Trea-
sury bonds for the period five years ahead, and they use five-year-ahead
projections of several federal fiscal variables, all as percentages of GDP,
as the principal explanatory variable. The ﬁscal variables are publicly held
debt, the unified budget deficit, the primary deficit (which excludes interest
payments), and revenue and primary outlays. Real interest rates are cal-
culated using the zero-coupon yield curve for the period five to fourteen
years ahead, adjusted for expected inflation. The fiscal variables are
taken from projections of the Congressional Budget Office. All regres-
sions also include expected GDP growth over the relevant period and a
constant term.
The OLS estimates in the simplest model, using annual data for 1976-
2004, show substantial and statistically significant effects on future inter-
est rates using either the debt variable or any of the deﬁcit variables: each of
the deﬁcit variables explains roughly twice as much of the variation in rates
as does debt. A sustained increase in the uniﬁed deﬁcit equal to 1 percent of
GDP raises the forward long-term interest rate by 29 basis points. The same
increase in the primary deficit raises the interest rate by 40 basis points.
Consistent with this result, the same changes due solely to reduced rev-
enue or solely to higher primary outlays raise rates by 42 and 37 basis
points, respectively. The authors also add to the equation terms interacting
their fiscal variables with dummy variables indicating recessions. When
these are included, the estimated effects of the fiscal variables on interest
rates rise modestly, suggesting that some business cycle effects remain in
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gested by earlier research, reduces the coefficients on the fiscal variables
somewhat, but their interpretation is not clear. The variable with the most
signiﬁcant effects, which the authors label the equity premium, is calculated
from real long-term rates and GDP growth, which are already on the left-
and right-hand sides of the estimating equation. 
Gale and Orszag go on to estimate a number of additional specifica-
tions as a way of checking the robustness of their main results. They use the
debt and uniﬁed deﬁcit variables together in equations explaining forward
real long-term rates, taking the projected debt at the end of four years and
the projected deﬁcit in the ﬁfth year to avoid double counting. In both OLS
and autoregressive moving average regressions for this specification,
deficits always dominate debt: the coefficient on the latter has the wrong
sign and is insignificant, and the deficit coefficient is larger than in the
regressions using deficits alone. In regressions explaining current, rather
than forward, real long-term interest rates, the estimated effects of the ﬁscal
variables are, not surprisingly, somewhat smaller than in the main equation.
In regressions explaining nominal forward long-term rates and including
expected inflation as an additional explanatory variable, the latter consis-
tently has a coefﬁcient near 1.0, and the deﬁcit effects are close to those in
the main regressions. The least successful speciﬁcation attempts to explain
current nominal long-term rates. In these regressions the coefficient on
expected inﬂation, the most signiﬁcant explanatory variable, ranges nearer
2.0 than 1.0; the coefficients on the fiscal variables are smaller and often
insignificant. The authors also vary the data period and demonstrate that
their main results are not sensitive to the exclusion of either 1976-81 or
2000-2004, two periods that some analysts view as atypical. 
Gale and Orszag conclude by addressing the current U.S. ﬁscal situation.
They reason that realistic budget projections should assume that the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent and that the alternative minimum tax
is amended so as to leave only 5 million households affected by it. (They do
not include the president’s plan to partially privatize the Social Security
system, which would significantly further enlarge deficits for decades.)
Amending the official Congressional Budget Office projections accord-
ingly, they calculate that the projected unified budget deficit will average
3.5 percent of GDP over the coming decade. Their empirical results imply
that, compared with a decade of balanced budgets, sustained deficits of
this size will reduce national saving by 2 to 3 percent of GDP and will
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years, the lower saving rate will have reduced the assets owned by Ameri-
cans by 20 to 30 percent of GDP from what they would have been. And, at
a 6 percent rate of return on capital, this smaller capital stock would reduce
national income by 1 to 2 percent by 2015 and in each year thereafter. 
Nonfarm payroll employment continued to decline for nearly two years
after the recession trough in November 2001, and by mid-2004 it was
barely back to its trough level. Employment in manufacturing, the sector
most affected by international trade, has been much weaker. As of Novem-
ber 2004 it was 3.2 million below its March 1998 peak and still 1.4 mil-
lion below its level at the recession trough. The fact that this weak
employment recovery was accompanied by a large expansion in the trade
deficit has led many to identify trade as the cause. What is more, the sub-
stantial public attention given to the offshoring of jobs to India in recent
years has raised the specter that jobs in the services sector, traditionally less
vulnerable than manufacturing jobs to foreign competition, might now be
increasingly exposed. Although economists typically focus on the long-
run gains from trade for the nation as a whole, the loss of important markets
to foreign competition is costly to the affected workers and ﬁrms and adds
to political pressure for trade protection. In the third article of this issue,
Martin Baily and Robert Lawrence examine employment in the current
recovery and analyze the role of foreign trade and of services offshoring
in its performance.
The authors ﬁrst review developments in manufacturing during the three
years ending in 2003, the last for which detailed annual industry data are
available. Over this period, manufacturing employment declined 16 percent,
far more than the 1.4 percent decline in employment of the nonfarm business
sector. The authors focus on two measures of the importance of trade to
manufacturing’s performance in this period. Measured as a share of manu-
facturing value added (the portion of GDP originating in the sector), the
manufacturing trade deﬁcit rose from 21.3 percent to 28.3 percent; as a share
of gross output—sales by manufacturing to other sectors—the deﬁcit rose
from 11.9 percent to 15.6 percent. The explanation for this development lies
more in export weakness than in import strength: manufactured exports fell
8.8 percent, while manufactured imports rose only 2.3 percent. Only one
of nineteen broad categories of manufacturing industry, primary metals, saw
its trade balance improve, and all nineteen suffered employment declines,
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fabricated metal products. 
To examine these developments more closely at the industry level, Baily
and Lawrence make use of the U.S. input-output tables for 1997, the most
recent ones available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the requisite
level of detail. Typically a sector’s output goes both for ﬁnal use and as an
input to production in other sectors. For a dollar of final use of any prod-
uct—consumption, exports, investment, or government expenditure—the
coefficients in the input-output tables permit calculation of the required
imports and output from each domestic sector, including the imports and
domestic output used as inputs to other sectors. Both industry and final-
use categories are specified at a highly detailed level and are taken from
(three-digit) North American Industry Classification System trade data,
plus domestic use. The authors aggregate the detailed industry categories in
the input-output tables into the nineteen two-digit manufacturing industries,
transform the gross output coefﬁcients to value-added coefﬁcients using the
1997 ratios, and calculate employment growth for each industry as the dif-
ference between growth in its value added and growth in its productivity.
This allows them to trace the effect of any change in ﬁnal use—exports less
imports plus domestic spending—on employment in manufacturing and in
each industry. 
The use of input-output tables for calculating value added by industry
reveals a picture of trade that may surprise observers accustomed to look-
ing only at the direct exports of each industry. Because the input-output
analysis traces through all intermediate as well as ﬁnal uses of each indus-
try’s output, it accounts for the indirect exports of an industry (goods sold
to other domestic firms for use as inputs in export production) as well as
its direct exports. It also accounts for the direct and indirect import content
of the industry’s production, including its production for export. For 2003,
this accounting reveals that primary metals is the most export-intensive
U.S. manufacturing industry, with 54 percent of its jobs coming from
exports. Shares for other heavily export-dependent industries are 37 percent
in computers, 30 percent in textiles, 28 percent in chemicals and in machin-
ery, 26 percent in “other transportation” (mainly aircraft), and 25 percent in
petroleum and coal products.
Turning to manufacturing as a whole, where employment declined by
2.74 million between 2000 and 2003, Baily and Lawrence calculate the
employment changes attributable to exports and imports. They take into
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cations of productivity increases in the exporting and import-competing sec-
tors. For a given level of exports, rising productivity reduces over time the
number of “export-created” jobs. Similarly, raising productivity reduces
the number of domestic jobs displaced by a given level of imports. Using
this accounting, Baily and Lawrence attribute a drop of 742,000 jobs, or 28
percent of the total decline, to weak export growth (exports grew more
slowly than productivity in those sectors producing exports) and a rise of
429,000 jobs to imports (imports grew more slowly than productivity in
import-displaced sectors). Combining the export and import ﬁgures results
in only 12 percent of the total decline of manufacturing employment being
attributed to trade. The remaining 88 percent is associated with weaker
domestic demand, the residual category in the allocation.
The authors recognize the conceptual issues that complicate any such
allocation and that alternative assumptions would lead to somewhat differ-
ent interpretations of the employment decline. For example, a different
decomposition could attribute all of the employment decline to productiv-
ity, because productivity rose about as much as output in this period. Or,
since imports respond predictably to changes in domestic demand, one
could attribute to domestic demand the change in imports that the change in
domestic demand would predict, and identify only the unpredicted part as the
“shock” from imports. A decomposition closer to public perceptions would
relate to the number of jobs lost because of lower exports or higher imports
without taking into account the implications of domestic productivity
growth. The authors briefly discuss such alternatives but regard their own
calculations as the most useful for examining the role of trade in the
employment decline. 
The predominance of weak domestic demand is again evident when the
authors examine the nineteen individual manufacturing industries. In this
analysis only chemical products experience an employment increase due
to increased domestic use. The importance of weak exports rather than
strong imports is also evident in the individual industry results. Several
industries experienced substantial employment declines due to weak
exports. None experienced large employment declines due to imports, and
eleven of the nineteen experienced increased employment because imports
rose by less than productivity. 
Baily and Lawrence next examine several potential explanations for the
weakness in exports. Although world output growth slowed in the period
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they show that the decline in the United States’share of world trade also
contributed importantly. Measured in dollars, the U.S. share of world
exports rose in the 1990s, particularly after 1995, but has fallen sharply
since 2000. When U.S. exports are valued by an index of other major cur-
rencies, this pattern is still evident, although not as strongly. The authors go
on to break down the changes in U.S. exports into four components. The
ﬁrst reﬂects the change in exports that would have been required to main-
tain a constant U.S. share of world trade, and the second and third show
the effects of changes in the composition of U.S. exports by commodity and
destination, respectively. The fourth, residual component includes the
effects of changes in competitiveness, along with any measurement errors
and other factors not captured by the ﬁrst three. 
By the authors’calculations, keeping the U.S. share of world trade con-
stant at its 2000 level would have required a $152 billion increase in exports
rather than the $46 billion decline that occurred. Changes in the commod-
ity composition of exports had little effect, but changes in destination coun-
try composition predicted (coincidentally) about a $46 billion decline. The
residual is a decline of $156 billion, which is presumed to mainly reflect
deteriorating competitiveness. Using established rules of thumb to trace the
effects of exchange rate variations through time, the authors conclude that
the strength of the dollar through much of this period can account for most,
if not all, of this residual weakness in exports and the negative impact of
trade on employment. 
Foreign competition in manufactured goods has been a fact of economic
life since countries ﬁrst began to industrialize in the eighteenth century. The
shifting of U.S. service jobs “offshore” is a recent development, however,
made possible by the technological revolution in communications. To gain
perspective on the importance of offshoring to the U.S. job market, Baily
and Lawrence focus on jobs offshored to India, the country beneﬁting most
from this new development. They start by confronting a serious data prob-
lem. Whereas economic analysis of goods trade can draw on a wealth of
detailed data going back several decades, data on offshoring of service
jobs are relatively scarce, and the two main sources tell seemingly very
different stories. One source is NASSCOM, a trade association for emerg-
ing business services industries in India; the other is the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA), whose conventional trade data include data on
services imports and exports between the United States and India. The BEA
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imports from India more than doubled between 1995 and 2000, to $1.9
billion, and then fell to $1.7 billion in 2002. But the NASSCOM data indi-
cate that exports to the United States in just two categories—software ser-
vices (such as computer programming) and business process services (such
as call centers and back ofﬁce processing)—totaled $6 billion that year, or
more than three times the BEA total. Possible sources of error in the BEA
data include the difficulty of distinguishing hardware from the software
bundled with it; the recording of packaged software as a good rather than
a service; and the BEA’s reliance on infrequently revised company surveys,
which may cause it to miss services imports by sectors not traditionally
associated with foreign trade. 
The authors also observe that the decline in services imports recorded by
the BEA in recent years is not consistent with the growing visibility of such
imports. Some might consider it an error in the NASSCOM export data that
some fraction of the services reported as Indian exports are actually per-
formed in the United States—for example, by workers on assignment to
U.S. client ﬁrms. However, they ﬁnd no support in U.S. immigration data
for an inﬂux of Indian temporary workers large enough to explain the rise
in employment reported by NASSCOM. And they note that such workers
would not be counted in the U.S. payroll employment data they are trying
to explain, and hence should be counted as displacing U.S. jobs regardless
of where their work is located. The authors therefore choose to base their
analysis on the NASSCOM data, which, if anything, set an upper bound
on jobs lost to offshoring. 
According to NASSCOM, employment in Indian services for export to
the United States rose by 91,500 a year between (roughly) 2000 and 2003,
divided about evenly between software and business processing services.
Although this is only a small fraction of average annual growth in total
U.S. services employment (2.1 million) during the 1990s, it is more than
a quarter of the slow growth in U.S. services employment in 2000–03.
Comparison with U.S. employment trends in services occupations that
are closely related to those being offshored is complicated by the surge of
jobs associated with Y2K. But, for the period from 1999 to 2003, employ-
ment rose by an average of 58,000 a year in high-wage IT occupations
and fell by an average of 107,000 a year in low-wage IT-enabled occupa-
tions—categories comparable to software and business processing ser-
vices, respectively, in the Indian data. Although each Indian job gained
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same, offshoring has clearly been an important cause of the weak job mar-
kets in these sectors, particularly in the low-wage occupations. 
To examine the kinds of changes in trade and in the composition of
domestic output that can be expected from offshoring in the longer run,
the authors use a macroeconomic model developed by the consulting ﬁrm
Macroeconomics Advisers, together with projections by Forrester Research
that indicate an additional 3.1 million service jobs will be lost to offshoring
by 2015. The baseline macroeconomic model assumes that lower fiscal
deﬁcits and dollar devaluation will reduce the U.S. current account deﬁcit
to 0.5 percent of GDP in that year, with monetary policy adjusting so as to
maintain full employment. The authors adjust the baseline for the assumed
loss of 3.1 million additional service jobs to offshoring and examine what
difference it makes. The authors’preferred way of modeling this rise in off-
shoring is through a shift in foreign supply resulting from improved pro-
ductivity abroad that lowers the price the United States pays for services
imports. In this case productivity growth quickens, and, by 2015, GDP is
2.6 percent higher and manufacturing employment 62,000 higher, all rela-
tive to baseline. Real compensation rises and real profits rise even more.
Although the authors see these projected changes as no more than illustra-
tive, they note that they are qualitatively consistent with the changes one
would expect from a more conventional opening of trade such as might
arise from reducing trade barriers. 
In concluding, Baily and Lawrence broaden their field of view to con-
sider the possible role of factors other than trade in the disappointing recent
growth of U.S. employment. Productivity growth has been rapid in this
same period, leading some to regard it as part of the explanation. But the
authors note that, although higher labor productivity at a given level of
output translates into lower employment, it may instead raise output by
improving competitiveness, leaving the effect on employment ambiguous.
They observe that the slowdown in productivity in the 1970s was accom-
panied by slower employment growth, whereas the acceleration of pro-
ductivity in the second half of the 1990s was accompanied by faster
employment growth and a reduction of unemployment to the lowest level in
decades. As they see it, rapid productivity growth after 2000 meant that
aggregate demand also would have had to grow rapidly to maintain employ-
ment growth. Although the 2001 recession was mild, the expansion of
aggregate demand that followed was not rapid enough. As principal fac-
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uncertainties following 9/11, the war in Iraq, higher oil prices, and the rise in
the dollar’s exchange value, all of which also help explain the weakness in
exports and the worsening trade balance. 
The stock market boom of the late 1990s and the record rates of business
investment that accompanied it were followed by an unusually large decline
in investment during the recession of 2001. Although, historically, invest-
ment has declined during recessions, this time the decline was extraordi-
nary—larger than that of GDP itself. Just as extraordinary has been the slow
recovery of investment: two years after the recession trough, investment
was still only slightly below its peak value of the second quarter of 2000.
Many observers, positing a link between the stock market and investment
booms, have blamed the depth of the investment decline and its slow recov-
ery on an “overhang” of capital from the earlier period. The sluggish per-
formance of investment has been used to justify sharp cuts in corporate
taxes, in the form of accelerated depreciation for most types of investment
and lower tax rates on dividends, to stimulate investment by lowering the
cost of capital. In the fourth article of this issue, Mihir Desai and Austan
Goolsbee look for evidence in support of the overhang story at the firm,
asset, and industry levels and evaluate the effectiveness of the tax stimulants
that were introduced in recent years. 
Although the overhang story ﬁts the aggregate behavior of the stock mar-
ket and investment in the 1990s and early 2000s, the authors do not con-
sider this evidence conclusive. It could be that the decline in investment
during the recession took place in a different set of ﬁrms and industries than
those that experienced the earlier run-up, in which case any overhang from
a previous binge cannot explain the current situation. To examine this pos-
sibility, they investigate investment behavior at the industry and ﬁrm levels.
They begin by performing a simple regression relating the change in the
rate of investment from 2000 to 2002 to that between 1994 and 1999 for a
sample of eighty-one nonoverlapping industries. Although the resulting
point estimate of the effect of investment growth in the earlier period is neg-
ative—industries in which investment grew rapidly in the first five-year
period did tend to have slower investment growth in the second—the effect
is small and statistically insignificant. For manufacturing, the estimated
negative relation is stronger: a 1-percentage-point faster rate of growth in
investment during the earlier period is associated with approximately a
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for investment in both equipment and structures; the results are similar for
investment in equipment alone and are highly significant.) The authors
note, however, that manufacturing represents only about 20 percent of total
investment, and so these results are consistent with a lack of significant
mean reversion in the growth of total investment.
Desai and Goolsbee report similar results on mean reversion of the
growth of investment by asset type across all industries. Examining twenty-
ﬁve different categories of equipment and nine categories of structures, they
again find that above-average increases in the rate of investment between
1994 and 1999 are followed by only slightly above average declines
between 2000 and 2002, and the relationship is insigniﬁcant.
The authors examine in greater detail a set of data for all ﬁrms reported
by Compustat; aggregate capital expenditure of the firms in this data set
constitutes 85 to 90 percent of private nonresidential investment in the
United States. Average growth rates of capital aggregated from the firm
level into three broad sectors—manufacturing, computer and information
businesses, and nonmanufacturing—display the same pattern as do the
aggregate data for the overall economy, with large increases in investment
rates during the 1990s followed by declines in 2000–02. The behavior of
the computer and information sector was most dramatic, with investment
more than doubling in the 1990s before falling back to less than 75 per-
cent of its initial level by the end of 2002. However, regressions for the
entire sample of firms show that changes in the growth rate of capital
between 1994 and 1999 have only slightly negative effects on growth rates
in the same firms in 2000–02. Without information from other periods, it
is hard to know whether there was more or less mean reversion in the
growth of investment, by ﬁrm or industry or asset type, in the early 2000s
than is typical during a slowdown. But the authors find the lack of evi-
dence of strong reversion suggestive, indicating that overhang may not be
the dominant factor inﬂuencing investment in recent years. 
Desai and Goolsbee do not explore the extent to which firms currently
find themselves with excess capacity, or, for those that do, the extent to
which it reflects excessive growth in capital in the 1990s rather than a
reduction in demand for their product. In either case, excess capacity would
be expected to result in lower investment and a lower market valuation rel-
ative to replacement cost—that is, a lower Tobin’s q. Instead the authors are
interested in knowing whether the extraordinary increases in ﬁrms’valua-
xxxii Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
2581-00b_Editors  Sum.qxd    1/18/05    13:12    Page  xxxiitions or investment in the 1990s have reduced the responsiveness of invest-
ment to changes in q in the current recovery. Such a reduction would help
explain the apparent ineffectiveness of the recent cuts in taxes on corpora-
tions and dividends in stimulating investment. Using Q (Tobin’s q adjusted
for the effect of the corporate proﬁts tax and the tax treatment of deprecia-
tion) they ﬁrst estimate an investment equation for the panel of Compustat
ﬁrms covering 1962–2003. On the right-hand side, in addition to the ﬁrm’s
Q and its ratio of cash flow to capital, they include fixed year effects and,
typically, ﬁxed ﬁrm effects and, for the period 2000–03, a term that interacts
Q with the change in q during the four-year period ending three years ear-
lier. This interaction is expected to capture whether ﬁrms that experienced
large increases in q during the stock market boom have a reduced sensitiv-
ity in subsequent years to Q and the tax effects it embodies. The estimated
coefficients on Q are small but highly significant, whereas the interaction
terms are unimportant. The same qualitative results are found for two sub-
sets of ﬁrms, information and manufacturing. Although these results leave
open the question of whether a capital overhang from the 1990s depressed
Q, and therefore investment, after 2000, they do not suggest that investment
became less responsive to Q.
The results are different, however, when the authors replace the past
change in q in the interaction term with the past percentage increase in the
firm’s net capital stock. This time the interaction terms are significant, indi-
cating that ﬁrms that had larger accumulations of capital in the 1990s were
indeed less sensitive to Q in the 2000s. For the firm with the largest past
increase in capital, the coefﬁcient on Q falls by 0.004, which corresponds to
roughly a 30 percent reduction in the sensitivity of investment to Q. For
the median firm the reduction in sensitivity resulting from the investment
boom is about 9 percent. 
Before turning to an examination of the impact of the recent tax cuts on
investment, the authors brieﬂy review tax-adjusted q theory, pioneered by
Lawrence Summers in the 1980s. According to the original q theory, invest-
ment in the absence of taxes is proportional to the difference between the
marginal value of capital and its replacement cost, and the proportionality
depends, inversely, on costs of adjustment. Summers recognizes four
important features of the tax law: the corporate proﬁts tax, investment tax
credits and noneconomic depreciation, dividend taxes, and taxes on capi-
tal gains, each of which modiﬁes one or the other of the terms in the non-
tax investment equation. The corporate proﬁt tax scales both q and the cost
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the form of the equation unchanged. Introduction of an investment tax
credit or accelerated depreciation simply modiﬁes the cost-of-capital term
and is equivalent to any other change in the price of capital goods. 
Dividend and capital gains taxes are more complicated. Assuming that
investors require a given after-tax rate of return, both dividend and capital
gains taxes raise the required before-tax rate of return and hence lower mar-
ket value, but their effect on investment is ambiguous because it depends on
how ﬁrms ﬁnance their investment. If ﬁrms ﬁnance investment by issuing
new equity, the dividend tax is relevant. In the short run a reduction in the
dividend tax increases q and encourages investment; in long-run equilib-
rium the capital stock is larger than it would have been without the tax cut,
earning a lower before-tax return but the same after-dividend-tax return,
and q returns to its initial value of 1.0 (in the absence of an investment tax
credit or noneconomic tax depreciation). In this case the dividend tax does
not appear in the q investment equation, its effects being completely
reﬂected in the ﬁrm’s market value, which in turn affects investment. The
authors label this case the “traditional” view and contrast it with what they
call the “new” view of dividend taxes, according to which dividends affect
firm market value but do not affect investment. This situation arises if a
firm’s earnings are more than sufficient to finance the desired level of
investment, so that retained earnings are the marginal source of funds. It
would make no sense for such a firm to sell new shares to finance invest-
ment while at the same time paying out earnings as dividends to share-
holders, who would have to pay tax on those dividends. 
Retaining and investing earnings increases the value of the ﬁrm’s stock
and delivers part of the return to investors through capital gains. Because
investors typically hold stocks a considerable time before selling, the effec-
tive tax rate on capital gains is below the statutory gains rate, and well
below the rate on dividends. A firm maximizing its value to shareholders
invests retained earnings up to the point where the after-tax value of a mar-
ginal dollar of earnings invested equals that of a dollar paid as a dividend.
A dollar of retained earnings that is used to purchase capital adds q to the
value of the firm. Assuming they are acting only on behalf of the share-
holders, a ﬁrm will invest until the value of q is signiﬁcantly below 1.0. If
it stopped adding to capital when q was 1.0, the after-tax value of the next
dollar invested would be greater than the after-tax value of that dollar paid
out as a dividend. 
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the level of either investment or dividends. It increases q by the same pro-
portion as the increase in the after-tax value of dividends, so that a firm
that previously was optimally balancing retained earnings and dividends
will not want to change either. In contrast, a reduction in the capital gains
rate, which also increases q in the short run, will lead the optimizing ﬁrm to
increase investment and reduce dividends. In the long run the market value
of the ﬁrm will be higher still, but q will be driven below its initial value.
Which of these two views, the “new” or the “traditional,” is a more accu-
rate description of reality? Given the importance to tax policy of knowing
the answer, Desai and Goolsbee ﬁnd it surprising that, with the exception of
studies of aggregate investment in the United Kingdom by James Poterba
and Summers, no one has attempted to directly estimate the effect of divi-
dend taxes on aggregate investment or to use ﬁrm data to control for aggre-
gate factors. In the case of the United States, part of the reason may be
that, until the 2003 tax cut, dividend taxes were never cut in isolation from
other tax changes. 
Before turning to a direct performance comparison of new and tradi-
tional investment equations, the authors examine the performance of sev-
eral other variants of the q equation in explaining investment of firms in
their Compustat sample for 1962–2003. All of the equations include year
and firm fixed effects. The authors try two different measures of q: one
with and the other without adjustment for the corporate profits tax. Like
most investment studies that, following theory, relate investment to q
minus the cost of capital, they find that the coefficient is generally highly
significant but quite small, implying unrealistically high adjustment costs.
The authors believe that this small coefficient is likely to reflect mea-
surement error in q that biases the coefficient toward zero. This leads
them to estimate an investment equation that allows separate estimates
of the response to q and the cost-of-capital terms for equipment and struc-
tures. They find that the coefficient on the cost of equipment (which rep-
resents roughly 80 percent of total investment) implies much more
reasonable costs of adjustment. The coefficient on the cost of structures is
insignificant, which the authors do not find surprising given the tradi-
tional difficulty in understanding the incentives for investment in struc-
tures. Using the earnings estimates of equity analysts as an instrument for
q is another way to deal with the possibility of measurement error, and it
likewise results in more reasonable estimates of the cost of adjustment.
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singly, but when they are entered together, the coefficient on tax-adjusted
q is much larger and of the correct sign, whereas unadjusted q takes on the
wrong sign. Both estimates are highly significant. This is consistent with
the presence of measurement error in q. The resulting errors in the tax-
adjusted term can be offset by a negative coefficient on the q variable
entered separately, allowing the variations in the tax rates to dominate
the estimation of the coefficient on tax-adjusted q. 
The authors regard these estimated investment equations as quite suc-
cessful. The coefficient on the cost of equipment, which incorporates an
adjustment for the tax treatment of depreciation, can be used to predict the
effect of the substantial increases in depreciation allowances enacted in
2002 and expanded in 2003 on virtually every type of equipment. But since
these equations do not account for the possible effects of capital gains and
dividend taxes, they cannot be used to evaluate the effects on investment
of the reduction in the capital gains tax rate from 20 percent to 15 percent
in 2003, or of the even more dramatic reduction in dividend taxes that
same year, from a maximum of 38.6 percent (the maximum tax rate on ordi-
nary income) to the new capital gains rate. As discussed above, the effect of
these changes should depend, crucially, on the financing margin facing
ﬁrms. Desai and Goolsbee rerun the regressions on the panel of ﬁrms, this
time including two q terms. The first one is appropriate for firms using
equity ﬁnancing of investment and reﬂects the traditional view, according
to which the dividend tax rate should affect investment. The second is
appropriate for a firm using retained earnings, reflecting the new view
according to which the dividend tax rate should not affect investment. The
new view q performs much better at predicting investment. For the entire
sample its coefﬁcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant, whereas the coefﬁ-
cient on traditional-view q is insigniﬁcant and of the wrong sign. The same
result holds for the subperiods 1962–96 and 1997–2003. The authors view
the results for the latter period as especially relevant for assessing current
tax policy, both because the current financial structure of firms is what
currently matters and because this is the period when the tax rates on capi-
tal gains and dividends changed the most. Indeed, for this period the supe-
riority of the new-view q is even greater: its coefﬁcient is roughly twice that
estimated using the entire sample. One awkwardness that arises with esti-
mates for this period, however, is that the cost-of-capital terms, which
were signiﬁcant using the entire sample, are now insigniﬁcant.
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2002 and 50 percent of investment in 2003 looks like a dramatic reduction
that could have a major effect on investment incentives. But, given that
investment in most forms of equipment could already be substantially writ-
ten off in the ﬁrst few years, the effects of immediate expensing are actually
quite modest. The authors calculate the effect of the partial expensing on
the cost of equipment, and on the cost of equipment plus structures, for
industries at the three-digit classiﬁcation level. Not surprisingly, the effects
differ substantially across industries. Firms that invest mostly in long-lived
assets, such as airlines, receive the largest benefit: expensing reduces the
cost of their capital by over 3 percent. In industries such as real estate and
hotels, in contrast, the reductions amount to only a fraction of a percent.
Overall these reductions average about 3 percent for equipment and 2 per-
cent for total investment. In comparison with earlier changes, such as the
investment tax credit of 1962 or the Reagan depreciation allowance
increases of 1981, all of which reduced capital costs by about 10 percent,
the effects of these changes are quite small. The authors offer two reasons
why: the corporate tax rate is lower today, so that the benefit of further
reductions is smaller; and investment has shifted toward shorter-lived
equipment such as computers. Even before the recent tax cuts, the present
value of depreciation allowances for equipment was already only 10 per-
cent less than that of full expensing. 
Given their belief that dividend tax cuts do not significantly affect the
required rate of return on capital, and given the modest effect that the 2002
and 2003 tax changes had on the tax-adjusted cost of equipment and struc-
tures, Desai and Goolsbee are not surprised that the Bush tax cuts have
had little apparent effect on investment. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, a 3 percent reduction in the cost of capital would increase
the desired capital stock by 3.0 percent in the long run if, as the authors
assume, output is held constant. If instead employment of labor is assumed
to be unchanged or to respond to the higher labor productivity from capi-
tal deepening, the increase of the capital stock would be substantially
greater. The authors estimate that costs of adjustment typically lead ﬁrms to
move only about a third of the way toward the long-run goal each year.
Using their assumption of constant output, the authors calculate the
increase in capital, for a representative ﬁrm in each of the three-digit indus-
tries, using the capital share and reduction in the cost of capital that they
estimate for each industry. They find that, on average, the increase in the
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1 to 2 percent, and the average total increase is still less than 2 percent by
the end of 2004. 
Desai and Goolsbee draw three broad conclusions from their study. First,
they see little evidence that a capital overhang from the 1990s plays a dom-
inant role in explaining the differences in investment across industries, asset
types, or ﬁrms in the 2000s. Second, the tax cuts of the early 2000s, despite
their high revenue cost, had minimal, if any, impact on marginal investment
incentives. The new view of investment, according to which dividend tax
cuts are capitalized in share prices but do not affect investment, is a better
description of firm behavior than the traditional view. Third, the partial
expensing provisions passed in 2002 and 2003 were not large enough to
provide much counterweight to the large declines in aggregate investment. 
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